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I. INDUSTRY-WIDE OR MARKET-SHARE LIABILITY
A generally accepted principle of tort law is that the plaintiff must prove
by a preponderance of the evidence that tortious conduct on the part of the
target defendant was at the very least a factual cause of the illness or injury
for which damages are sought. In the alternative, he must prove that the
defendant is vicariously liable for the actions of another whose conduct
proved to be a cause.' The element of tort causation in Texas is generally
referred to as "proximate cause."12 Proximate cause is then subdivided into
the necessary elements of causation in fact and foreseeability. 3 Causation
in fact means that the defendant's tortious conduct was a substantial factor
in causing the injury.4 Foreseeability, however, focuses upon the aspect of
reasonability: should the defendant, as a person of ordinary intelligence,
have anticipated the danger to others that was created by his act?5
In general, the plaintiff carries the burden of proof as to proximate
cause,6 but it is not necessary that the plaintiff prove that an injury posi-
* B.A., LL.B., University of Texas; S.I.D., Harvard University; LL.D., Southern
Methodist University.
1. Technical Chem. Co. v. Jacobs, 480 S.W.2d 602, 604 (Tex. 1972) (proof of causation
necessary element of strict liability); Lenger v. Physician's Gen. Hosp., Inc., 455 S.W.2d 703,
706 (Tex. 1970) (causation necessary element of negligence action).
2. See McClure v. Allied Stores of Tex., Inc., 608 S.W.2d 901, 903 (Tex. 1977); Mo.
Pac. R. Co. v. American Statesman, 552 S.W.2d 99, 103 (rex. 1977); Farley v. MM Cattle
Co., 529 S.W.2d 751, 755 (rex. 1975); East Tex. Theaters, Inc. v. Rutledge, 453 S.W.2d 466,
468 (Tex. 1970).
3. Mo. Pac. R. Co. v. American Statesman, 552 S.W.2d 99, 103 (rex. 1977). Both
elements of proximate cause must be present, but they may be established by circumstantial
evidence. Farley v. MM Cattle Co., 529 S.W.2d 751, 755 (Tex. 1975). Proximate cause must
be proved by evidence of probative force; it cannot be established by mere guess or conjec-
ture by the factfinder. See Clark v. Waggoner, 452 S.W.2d 437, 440 (Tex. 1970). See gener-
al/y Keeton, Torts, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 27 Sw. L.J. 1, 6 (1973); Keeton, Torts,
Annual Survey of Texas Law, 23 Sw. L.J. 1, 13 (1969).
4. McClure v. Allied Stores of Tex., Inc., 608 S.W.2d 901, 903 (rex. 1977). Not only
does causation in fact require the tortious conduct to be a substantial factor in pro.ducing the
injury, it also requires that no harm at all would have resulted had the conduct not taken
place. Tex. Pac. Ry. Co. v. McCleery, 418 S.W.2d 494,497 (rex. 1967). In this regard, cause
in fact r."uires a "but for" nexus; that is, but for the tortious act of the defendant, the injury
to the plaintiff would not have occurred.
5. McClure v. Allied Stores of Tex., Inc., 608 S.W.2d 901, 903 (Tex. 1977).
6. See, e.g., Birmingham v. Gulf Oil Cor., 516 S.W.2d 914, 917 (rex. 1974);
Hilzendager v. Methodist Hosp., 596 S.W.2d 284, 287 (rex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.]
1980, no writ); Brownstone Park Ltd. v. Southern Union Gas Co., 537 S.W.2d 270, 272 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Austin 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Shield v. California Pool Serv., Inc., 515 S.W.2d
342, 34 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [ist Dist.] 1974, no writ).
SOUTHWESTERN LW JOURNAL
tively resulted from a defendant's misconduct,7 only that the "greater
probability" was that the defendant's misconduct caused the injury.8 The
plaintiff's burden of proof is not of the magnitude of sole cause; rather it is
of a concurring cause that might have been contemplated by the defendant
at the time of the tortious act.9 The allocation of the burden of proof to a
claimant also amounts to an allocation of the risk of loss to such a person
for an illness or an injury if the more likely cause cannot be identified at
trial.' 0 This result can be justified on two grounds: the security and well-
being of those engaged in socially desirable activities are just as important
as the security and well-being of those who are injured; and a loss ought
not to be shifted from a victim unless he can establish that it was attributa-
ble to tortious conduct of the defendant. "l The burden of persuasion or of
producing some evidence is sometimes shifted to a defendant to prove that
his conduct was not a proximate cause. This shift usually occurs in situa-
tions in which the defendant's actions could have been a proximate
cause.' 2 The justification for shifting the burden of proximate cause proof
is the theory that the risk of loss, as a matter of justice and fairness, should
be allocated to the defendant when the causative agency cannot be
established. '3
The potential difference between a plaintiff's and a defendant's duty to
prove causation or lack of causation is emphasized in claims based on in-
dustry-wide liability. Industry-wide liability is a hybrid concept of liabil-
ity drawn from the theories of alternate or concurrent liability 14 as well as
from doctrines of products liability. The result is a type of absolute liabil-
7. Birmingham v. Gulf Oil Corp., 516 S.W.2d 914, 917 (Tex. 1974).
8. McClure v. Allied Stores of Tex., Inc., 608 S.W.2d 901, 904 (Tex. 1977).
9. Id at 903. See also Mo. Pac. R. Co. v. American Statesman, 552 S.W.2d at 103.
10. C. MORRIS, TORTS 7-8 (2d ed. 1980).
11. Id
12. See W. PROSSER, TORTS 243 (4th ed. 1971). Prosser characterizes the approach as
"clearly established double fault and alternative liability." Id In one sense, however, the
rules of proximate cause have not been relaxed, for the plaintiff must affirmatively prove
proximate causation by some defendant, even if he is not certain which one or ones actually
caused the injury. Only then will the burden shift. Thus, the plaintiff is not relieved of
proving the element of proximate cause itself, only who was the specific catalyst of the proxi-
mate cause. See O'Neal v. Morgan, 637 F.2d 846, 851-52 (2d Cir. 1980) (civil rights action
for false arrest); Huddell v. Levin, 537 F.2d 726, 737 (3d Cir. 1976) (strict liability action
under New Jersey law); Burton v. Waller, 502 F.2d 1261, 1282 (5th Cir. 1974) (civil rights
action applying Mississippi tort law where necessary); Mizell v. Eli Lilly & Co., 526 F. Supp.
589, 595 (D.S.C. 1981) (South Carolina law applied). The doctrine is derived from the ini-
tial case of Summers v. Tice, 33 Cal. 2d 80, 199 P.2d 1 (1948).
13. See Technical Chem. Co. v. Jacobs, 480 S.W.2d 602, 606 (rex. 1972), in which the
Texas Supreme Court noted that a presumption exists that a plaintiff would have read a
warning label had it been attached to a product; thus, it is incumbent upon the defendant to
negate such proximate cause as to label warnings. The presumption could be rebutted, for
example, if it were shown that the plaintiff is blind and us unable to read the warning. Id
See generally W. PROSSER, supra note 12, § 39.
14. For example, if two defendants are wrongdoers and could have caused the injury
but the plaintiff cannot ascertain which actually did cause it, courts may relax the plaintiff's
burden and require each defendant to prove that he was not the proximate cause of the
injury. See W. PROSSER, supra note 12, at 243.
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ity.' 5 Industry-wide liability has been applied only in cases in which a
product has been manufactured, such as a drug, and it is impossible to
determine which manufacturer among many produced the specific product
in question.' 6 Once the plaintiff has proven injury and causation by the
product, the burden shifts to the industry-wide defendants to exonerate
themselves by showing that their respective products could not have
caused the injury.' 7 The doctrine thus forces defendants to point fingers of
blame at one another. If the industry-wide defendants are unable to iso-
late the causation for the plaintiff's injury, liability is consequently appor-
tioned amongst those defendants not able to disprove proximate cause in
accordance with a percentage share of a defined relevant sales market.'
8
Because the difficulty in proving proximate cause is not a circumstance of
the plaintiff's making, the doctrine of industry-wide liability fashions a
way around product identification. 19
The point that I have chosen to make at the outset of the treatment of
this very important subject of industry-wide liability is that the rules re-
lated to the burden of persuasion and to presumptions are rules that have
the effect of allocating risks of losses between claimants and defendants
just as surely as do the rules of substantive law. 20 Policy considerations as
to who should bear the risk of loss when the precise causative agent cannot
be ascertained sometimes induce courts to make exceptions to the general
rule which allocates the loss to the claimant or victim. This simply means
that there are some situations when, as fairness and justice dictate as be-
tween the plaintiff and the defendant, the risk of loss should be on the
defendant or a group of defendants when the cause is uncertain so long as
there is a reasonable probability that the defendant or each of a group was
a causative agency.
Another device to allocate the risk of loss as between two parties relates
to the subject of vicarious liability. This has nothing to do with "the un-
certainty" about causation. Rather, this is a device to allocate risks be-
tween two persons when the conduct of neither was a cause, but when
15. Hardy v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 509 F. Supp. 1353, 1357 (E.D. Tex. 1981),
appeal docketed, No. 81-2204 (5th Cir. May 29, 1981) (asbestos group product action).
16. The only two products involved have been diethylstilbesterol-a synthetic estrogen
referred to commonly as DES-and blasting caps that, following explosion, cannot be iden-
tified as to manufacturer. See Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 26 Cal. 3d 588, 607 P.2d 924,
163 Cal. Rptr. 132, cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 286, 66 L. Ed. 2d 140 (1980) (DES); Ferrigno v.
Eli Lilly & Co., 175 N.J. Super. 551, 420 A.2d 1305 (Super. Ct. Law Div. 1980) (DES). See
also Hall v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 345 F. Supp. 353 (E.D.N.Y. 1972) (blasting
caps).
17. Hardy v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 509 F. Supp. 1353, 1357 (E.D. Tex. 1981),
appeal docketed, No. 81-2204 (5th Cir. May 29, 1981).
18. See generally Comment, DES and a Proposed Theory of Liability, 46 FORDHAM L.
REv. 963 (1978); Note, Industry- Wide Liability, 13 SUFFOLK L. REv. 980 (1979).
19. Hardy v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 509 F. Supp. 1353, 1358 (E.D. Tex. 1981),
appeal docketed, No. 81-2204 (5th Cir. May 29, 1981).
20. For a discussion of industry-wide liability's potential impact, see Newcomb, Market
Share Liabilityfor Defective Products.- An I11/Advised Remedyfor the Problem of Idenqgca-
tion, 76 Nw. L.J. 300 (1981).
1982] TORTS
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some third person's conduct was a cause. 2' The defendant is held vicari-
ously liable in those situations when it is considered that as between the
parties to the lawsuit, the defendant should be responsible for the tortious
conduct of the third person.
These two problems relating to the allocation of the risk of loss between
parties to the litigation have been catapulted into current prominence as a
consequence of a large number of claims that have been made in two sepa-
rate and distinct general situations: (1) claims based on the notion that a
drug commonly referred to as DES (a synthesized form of the female hor-
mone estrogen) has caused a type of cervical or vaginal cancer in the
daughters of mothers who were treated with the drug to prevent miscar-
riages; and (2) claims that have been made nationwide during the last dec-
ade (perhaps as many as 12,000 to 15,000, primarily in federal courts)
against defendants who made and sold insulation products containing va-
rying amounts of asbestos.
It is important to note the historical backgrounds of the DES and asbes-
tos litigation in order to fully appreciate the impact of risk-of-loss analysis
in decisions endorsing industry-wide liability. DES is a synthesized hor-
mone produced primarily to prevent miscarriages during pregnancy.22 It
was first approved for public use by the Federal Drug Administration
(FDA) in 1947, and prescription of the drug by doctors caused its distribu-
tion to millions of pregnant women prior to 1970.23 In 1971, however,
statistical studies indicated a significant relationship between use of DES
and the development of cancer in the daughters of the users.24 Because of
an increasing fear concerning the ill effects on the offspring of DES users,
in 1971 the FDA effectively banned the drug.25
Difficulties in the area of asbestos insulation arose about the same time
as those evolving from DES use. During World War II and for some years
21. What has emerged as the modem justification for vicarious liability is a rule of
policy, a deliberate allocation of the risk. See Seavey, Speculation as to Respondeat Superior,
in HARvARD LEGAL ESSAYS 433 (1934); Douglas, Vicarious Liability and Administration of
Risk, 38 YALE L.J. 684, 720 (1929).
22. DES was first synthesized in England in 1938 but never was patented. It was less
expensive than natural estrogen and could be administered orally. See Comment, DES and
a.Proposed Theory o/Liabiity, 46 FoRDHAm L. REv. 963, 963 n.I (1978).
23. Id at 964. Because of the mass production of the product, which at the time was
thought to be an effective means of preventing miscarriages, no one is sure how many com-
panies manufactured DES for use in pregnancy or which companies manufactured the drug
for certain pharmacies. fd at 964 n.3. The number of producers has been estimated to
exceed 300, but this approximation is unconfirmed. Id Much of the problem results from
the fact that DES still is marketed in the United States for a variety of purposes, not the least
of which is as an ingredient to birth control pills. Id at 963 n.2.
24. Id at 964. Although studies continue, the relationship appears to be based on more
than conjecture.
25. Id at 966. DES, nevertheless, still is used to prevent certain types of breast cancer.
Id at 963 n.2. This use, in part, accounts for the fact that virtually every major drug com-
pany in the United States has been named a defendant in the DES suits arising since 1971.
Id at 967. For a discussion of the medical problems linked to DES, see Greenwald, Barlow,
Nesca, & Burnett, Vaginal Cancer After Maternal Treatment With Synthetic Estrogen, 285
NEW ENO. J. MED. 390 (1971); Herbst, Uelfelder, & Poskanzer, Adenocarcinoma of the Va-
gina, 284 NEW ENO. J. MED. 878 (1971).
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TORTS
thereafter about 40% of all insulation products were asbestos-containing. 26
The percentage has now dropped materially with advances in the state of
the art in the use of less dangerous substances. Asbestos-containing mate-
rial was probably the most effective material available to insulate against
extremely high temperatures, often as high as 1,000 degrees. Claims that
have been filed are based on the assumption that insulation workers ac-
quired lung disorders, including asbestosis, and often a form of fatal lung
cancer from exposure to air laden with asbestos fibres.27
Claims in both of these types of cases have been filed some twenty or
more years after exposure to defendants' products. Both types of claims
present very difficult problems of causation and concert of action, resulting
in decisions abandoning the usual rules about relating tortious conduct to
plaintiff's injury or illness. Establishing legal liability for a product-re-
lated disease confronts a lawyer and a court with several problems not
usually present in the case of an injury arising out of a single and isolated
damaging event. The long latency period in these so-called "creeping dis-
ease" situations poses a number of questions other than causation, includ-
ing: (1) those relating to the liability of successor entities and of
stockholders of dissolved corporations; (2) those relating to insurance cov-
erage since several different insurance carriers may have insured the de-
fendant with somewhat different language as to coverage; (3) conflict of
laws problems presented as a consequence of the fact that occupational
exposures may have often been multi-state exposures; and (4) problems
related to both misuse with appreciation of danger by employers and vic-
tims and unforeseeable misuse. When the strict rules of causation must be
relaxed due to such peculiar factual circumstances, which invoke industry-
wide liability, it is then that the theories of allocating risk of loss can be
especially helpful in defining proper causation burdens of proof.
Applying "Erie indicators," a federal district judge in the Eastern Dis-
trict of Texas, for discovery purposes, has espoused the position that Texas
26. See Barel v. Fibreboard Paper Prod. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076, 1083 (5th Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 869 (1974).
27. Medical testimony indicated that asbestos inhalation, even in the least affected in-
dustrial settings, can be responsible for the lung diseases of asbestosis and mesotheioma.
493 F.2d at 1083. Much of the history of these claims is set forth in the Borel opinion.
Borel, an insulation worker from 1936 to 1969, died of asbestosis and mesothelioma caused
by exposure to concentrations of asbestos dust generated by insulation materials. As such,
his affliction fitted within the rubric of occupational disease, which means an impairment of
health resulting from conditions of employment. See Note, Compensaing Victimu of Occu-
pational Diseases, 93 HI-Rv. L. REv. 916 (1980).
Some administrative law cases related to litigation about regulatory standards involved
legal principles somewhat similar to those involved with tort concepts. These cases are use-
ful evidentiary sources on causal connection between toxic substances or atmospheric condi-
tions polluted with toxic substances and occupational disease. See American Petroleum
Inst. v. OSHA, 581 F.2d 493 (5th Cir. 1978), aff'dsub non& Industrial Union Dept, AFL-
CIO v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 609 (1980) (benzene standard); American Iron &
Steel Inst. v. OSHA, 577 F.20 825 (3d Cir. 1978) (coke oven emission standard); Society of
the Plastics Indus., Inc., v. OSHA, 509 F.2d 1301 (2d Cir. 1975) (vinyl chloride standard).
They also demonstrate how elusive are the concepts of reasonable scientific knowability and
legal cause of harm in the occupational disease context. See id at 1308.
1982]
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will adopt some form of industry-wide liability, thereby relieving the
claimant of the necessity of showing that exposure to the named defend-
ant's specific product was the proximate cause of the alleged injury. In
Hardy v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp. fifty-seven claims were consolidated
against multiple manufacturers of insulation products containing varying
amounts of asbestos. 28 One defendant filed a cross-action for contribution
against other defendants; a motion for discovery was filed based upon the
assumption that each defendant would be subject to liability for a propor-
tionate amount of the plaintiff's damages represented by the defendant's
market share of asbestos-containing products.29 Intimating that Texas
courts would adopt some form of industry-wide liability in asbestos-re-
lated cases, the district court granted the defendant's motion for discov-
ery.30 The court, however, refused to consider whether industry-wide
liability would apply in a trial on the merits, limiting its opinion only to
the motion for discovery.3' The issue of what constitutes a relevant market
in terms of applying market-place proportional damages also was side-
stepped by the court, thereby leaving the Hardy opinion quite limited in
scope. 32 The federal judge, however, did recognize that 1) three courts in
such cases have accepted a concept of enterprise or industry-wide liability
when the product of a particular manufacturer could not be identified as
the causative agent;3 3 2) Texas had adopted a concept of concurrent liabil-
ity in an oil industry pollution case when the plaintiff's injury was indivisi-
ble as to the causative defendant;34 and, 3) Texas courts are likely to adopt
some kind of comparative causative fault analysis.35
A. Water and Air Pollution and the Single Damaging Event
A substantial number of cases involve injuries or illnesses resulting from
a single exposure to polluted water or air in which two or more tortious
actors contributed to the polluted condition. These are cases where claim-
ants have not been able to recover damages without identifying the event
that caused the plaintiff's injury, the polluted condition that caused the
event, or the varied contributors to the polluted condition. In these cases,
28. 509 F. Supp. 1353 (E.D. Tex. 1981). Some of the plaintiffs were insulation workers,
some were pipefitters, and some were carpenters and factory workers. Thus, they were not
exposed to the same level of asbestos fibre concentration. Consequently, the issues relating
to failure to warn and causation were not the same. Id at 1354.
29. Id at 1355-56.
30. Id at 1355. Judge Parker hesitated to make sweeping determinations of Texas law,
as Texas courts have not had occasion to approach the question of market-wide liability.
Sounding the "Erie-alarm," he nevertheless treaded into uncharted waters, at least insofar as
the discovery issue was concerned, stating that "it becomes the Court's duty to determine
what course Texas law would follow were the issues of [market-wide] liability and market
share apportionment presented to the state's highest court." id at 1356-57.
31. Id at 1357.
32. Id at 1359-60.
33. The cases are set forth in note 16 supra.
34. See Landers v. East Tex. Salt Water Disposal Co., 1,51 Tex. 251, 248 S.W.2d 731
(1952). See notes 38-40 infra and accompanying text.
35. Hardy v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 509 F. Supp. 1353, 1359 (E.D. Tex. 1981),
appeal docketed, No. 81-2204 (5th Cir. May 29, 1981).
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the plaintiff has recovered only upon proof of a greater likelihood that 1) a
polluted condition was the cause of the illness; 2) the condition was
brought about as a consequence of the independent and separate conduct
of several tortious actors; and, 3) the contribution of each tortious actor
was substantial.36 Most courts have considered the claimant's injury to be
divisible so that each defendant is liable for only a proportionate share of
the damages; the rationale is that one cannot be made a joint tortfeasor
merely by the rules of joinder.37 Something more, such as concert of ac-
tion, is required to lessen the plaintiff's burden of proof as to causation.
In Landers v. East Texas Salt Water Disposal Co., however, the Supreme
Court of Texas held that where two defendants independently contributed
to the pollution of a lake with salt water, and the amount of independent
contribution per defendant could not be determined, each would be jointly
liable for the entire amount.38 In this case, the time of the injury as well as
the event from which the injury arose was clearly identified. The decision
was based upon the notion of fairness that a plaintiff should not have to
bear the onerous burden of proving a percentage of contribution by a de-
fendant. 39 In effect, the risk of loss was shifted to the defendant because of
the policy need to compensate an injured plaintiff. Landers thus repre-
sents a minority view; most courts would probably adopt the view that the
harm caused by the pollution is divisible. The question then becomes
whether the harm caused by the pollution is divisible and whether each
defendant will be liable for a pro rata portion of the damages if the
amount of contribution of each cannot be ascertained. 4°
B. Asbestos Cases Involving Long-Term Exposure
There is no effective way to identify the events in the working-life his-
tory of a particular plaintiff stricken by asbestosis that would establish the
true cause of the disease. In Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Products Corp., a
36. See Sun Oil Co. v. Robicheaux, 23 S.W.2d 713 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1930, holding
approved). The Robicheaux court ruled that an action at law for tort damages cannot be
maintained against several defendants where their actions did not occur in concert and
where the plaintiff is unable to prove sufficient fault as to each. Id at 715. The court rea-
soned that each tortfeasor is liable only for the damages he actually caused; he cannot be
held jointly and severally liable by procedural joinder. Id Independent action by
tortfeasors, however, was subject to prospective equitable relief. Id
37. In these cases, strong emphasis is placed on the "independent" quality of the
tortfeasor's conduct. Mitchell Realty Co. v. City of West Allis, 184 Wis. 352, 199 N.W. 390,
396 (1924); Farley v. Crystal Coal & Coke Co., 85 W. Va. 595, 102 S.E. 265 (1920); Pulaski
Anthracite Coal Co. v. Gibboney Sand Bar Co., 110 Va. 444, 66 S.E. 73, 74 (1909). See
generally F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS 1125 (1956).
38. 151 Tex. 251, 258, 248 S.W.2d 731, 735 (1952). Justice Calvert conducted an exten-
sive analysis of both jurisdictional approaches and legal commentary on the issue of joint
and several liability of independently contributing tortfeasors. Id at 255, 248 S.W.2d at 733.
39. The Landers court explicitly overruled the decision in Sun Oil Co. v. Robicheaux,
23 S.W.2d 713 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1930, holding approved), stating that "if such has been
the law, from the standpoint of justice it should not have been; if it is the law now, it will not
be hereafter." Id at 734.
40. See the cases collected in note 37 supra; cf. Slater v. Pacific Am. Oil. Co., 212 Cal.
648, 300 P. 31 (1931) (damages denied because of impossibility of ascertaining defendants'
contributions, but injunctive relief preventing further pollution granted).
1982]
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wrongful death action in which the decedent had died from cancer, the
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held each of the several manufacturers of
asbestos-containing products liable for all damages (absent a specific
showing of causation by the plaintiff as to particular defendants) with the
simple explanation that the jury was justified in finding that each defend-
ant's product was a cause of the illness and death.4' While the court in
Borel did not specifically utilize the risk-of-loss theories to shift the burden
of proving specific causation from plaintiff to defendants, such was the
practical effect of the opinion. Realistically, however, all that the plaintiff
can establish in the creeping-illness cases is that each exposure to a product
containing asbestos involved a risk of making a contribution to the severity
of the disease. A victim's illness in nearly all of the asbestos cases has
occurred as a consequence of some combination of the polluted conditions
occurring over a period of ten to twenty-five years from the time of first
exposure to manifestation of the disease.42 This is quite different from a
case where the conduct of several defendants combines to produce a single
polluted condition that was clearly the cause of death or injury.43 There is
a similarity, however, in that each defendant's product was involved in at
least one of the events that could have been a contributing factor.
C Industry- Wide Liability and Concert of Action
It is generally accepted that concert of action on the part of a group with
intent to achieve certain ends can result in both tort and criminal liability
of each member of the group for the actions of others in the group.4" Each
group member thus becomes vicariously liable for the conduct of others in
the achievement of the common goal.45 This is because group action to
achieve such ends is antisocial and inimical to the general welfare.46 This
concept, however, seldom has been utilized in tort law outside the area of
price-fixing or boycotting. The usual situation involving concert of action
relating to physical harm claims has been one where two or more persons
have acted simultaneously and dangerously in carrying out a particular
undertaking pursuant to an express or implied agreement. 47 It is therefore
said that when one does a tortious act in concert with the other, or pursu-
41. 493 F.2d 1076, 1094 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 869 (1974).
42. 493 F.2d at 1083, 1094.
43. See notes 37-40 supra and accompanying text.
44. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 876 (1965). The Restatement specifically dis-
claims application of this section when strict liability is involved. Id
45. One legal scholar has commented:
[I]t now seems generally agreed, although there has been authority to the con-
trary, that there are certain types of conduct, such as boycotts, in which the
element of combination adds such a power of coercion, undue influence or
restraint of trade, that it makes unlawful acts which one man alone might
legitimately do. It is perhaps pointless to debate whether in such a case the
combination or conspiracy becomes itself the tort, or whether it merely gives a
tortious character to the acts done in furtherance of it.
W. PROSSER, supra note 12, at 293 (footnotes omitted).




ant to a common design with the other, he assumes consequential liability
for the tortious act of the latter.48 It is also said that when one knowingly
aids and abets another in the commission of a tortious act, he will be sub-
ject to liability for the tortious act of another.49 These are defined as ex-
amples of vicarious liability. They are principles originally announced
and created to deter antisocial group behavior; they were not initially
promulgated to escape various difficulties with causation. Therefore, it can
be reasoned that any attempt to apply these theories of liability to the as-
bestos and DES cases in order to solve a causation problem is questiona-
ble. It is, of course, indeed possible that there has been antisocial group
behavior of a kind that ought to subject each member of the group to lia-
bility for harm resulting from conduct identical to the type of conduct
committed by all other members of the group. But this is not necessarily
the proper rationale for applying the aforementioned theories of liability
to such antisocial group behavior. A more straightforward approach
would be to announce the policy of liability in such group situations based
upon the theories of risk of loss, for example.
The most frequently recurring situation relating to these principles is
that of negligent automobile racing on the highway. 50 In that situation,
each defendant's conduct can be regarded as a cause of the accident of
another driver involved in the race as opposed to an example of vicarious
liability. The aiding and abetting section of the Restatement (Second) of
Torts states that the defendant must know that the other's conduct consti-
tutes a breach of duty in order for this liability to apply.51 Drag races
constitute such an example, but this principle does not apply simply be-
cause the defendant aided and abetted another in doing something that
was proved later to be tortious. Concert of action usually does not result in
joint liability for acts pursuant to the joint undertaking in the absence of
simultaneous action unless the objective to be obtained by joint action is
regarded as antisocial in its nature.5 2
Evidence has been introduced, especially in the DES cases, for the pur-
pose of showing a certain amount of concert of action on the part of those
manufacturers engaged in the production and marketing of DES. A con-
cert of action theory therefore has been advanced primarily to escape a
burden of proof problem as to causation. 53 Parallel practices provide a
basis for charges of concert of action in the sense of action taken in re-
sponse to an express or implied-in-fact agreement of the group. One possi-
ble advantage to this theory is the unusual manner in which drugs are
marketed. As the marketing of new drugs must be approved by the FDA,
48. Id § 876(a).
49. Id § 876(b).
50. See, e.g., Skroh v. Newby, 237 So. 2d 548 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1970); Bierczynski v.
Rogers, 239 A.2d 218 (Del. 1968); Boykin v. Bennett, 253 N.C. 725, 118 S.E.2d 12 (1961).
See also W. PROSSER, supra note 12, at 29.
51. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 876(b) (1965).
52. Id, comment d.
53. See, e.g., Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 26 Cal. 3d 588, 607 P.2d 924, 163 Cal.
Rptr. 132, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980).
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joint clinical files are often submitted by a group of drug manufacturers.
The manufacturers join statistical forces in order to achieve government
approval.5 4 The companies may have collaborated in other ways as well.
Suffice it to say that this theory should be applicable only if there is evi-
dence to show an implied-in-fact agreement to act in a manner that each
defendant knew to be wrongful or to act in a similar manner to achieve an
objective that should not have been achievable by collaborative action.
Concert of action thus has been considered a possible basis for recovery
in several DES cases. Conversely, it has also been rejected as a possible
basis for recovery. In Bichler v. Eli Lilly & Co. ,5 the Supreme Court, Ap-
pellate Division, of New York gave the following instruction:
If you find that defendant and the other drug companies either con-
sciously paralleled each other in failing to test DES on pregnant mice,
as a result of some implied understanding, or that they acted indepen-
dently of each other in failing to do such testing, but that such in-
dependent actions had the effect of substantially aiding or
encouraging the failure to test by the others, then you should find that
the defendant wrongfully acted in concert with the other drug manu-
facturers in the testing and marketing of D.E.S. for use in accidents of
pregnancy.56
This instruction seems to assume that if it was agreed that testing was un-
necessary and there was an implied understanding to that effect, each man-
ufacturer would be vicariously liable for harm caused by the sale of DES
once a defect was proved, even in the absence of negligence, fraud, decep-
tion, or misrepresentation to the FDA.
D. Concert of Action by Way of Joint Control o/Risk
A product is defective as sold if it is sold in the kind of condition that
makes it unreasonably dangerous. In Hall v. E.1 Du Pont de Nemours &
Co., the New York district court applied a concert of action theory by
holding that when manufacturers of a fungible or identical product collab-
orated in controlling the risk or dangerous propensities of that product,
each accepts vicarious liability for the identical or substantially identical
conduct of the other.57 In Hall thirteen children were injured in a series of
unrelated accidents spanning a period of four years. Injuries occurred in
ten different states. The plaintiffs were citizens of the states in which the
injuries occurred. The plaintiffs were claiming damages against six differ-
ent manufacturers of blasting caps as well as the defendant's trade associa-
tion, the Institute of Makers of Explosives (IME). The plaintiffs' primary
contentions were that the injuries were caused by the defendants' failure to
place warnings on the blasting caps, and that the defendants' production of
caps was such that the product was too susceptible to accidental detona-
tion. The court explicitly noted that joint control of risk did not require a
54. Comment, supra note 22, at 1006.
55. 79 A.D.2d 317, 436 N.Y.S.2d 625 (1981).
56. 436 N.Y.S.2d at 631.
57. 345 F. Supp. 353 (E.D.N.Y. 1972).
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profit-sharing joint venture.58 The court then stated that joint control can
be shown in one of three ways: first, by explicit agreement; second, by the
defendants' parallel behavior sufficient to show tacit agreement; and third,
by acting independently in adhering to an industry-wide standard or to a
customary standard, thereby engaging in joint control of the risk.59 The
Hall decision thus makes collaboration in the establishment of industry
standards a questionable legal practice.
E. The "Alternative Liability" Theory
Courts, in a variety of situations, have permitted a plaintiff to join two or
more defendants and prove that one or the other defendant probably
caused a damaging event out of which an indivisible injury or illness arose.
The plaintiff then is allowed to obtain a recovery against each defendant
for the entire amount of damages in the absence of exculpating evidence
from one of the defendants to show that its conduct could not have been a
factor.60 This "alternative liability" theory is for the explicit purpose of
escaping the usual burden of proof requirements of causation and there-
fore allocates the risk of loss to the several defendants rather than to the
victim when the causative agent cannot be ascertained.
The leading example of this theory is Summers v. Tice.6 1 This was a
case in which two negligent hunters simultaneously fired in the direction of
the plaintiff, one bullet striking him. The plaintiff was unable to identify
the gun which fired the damaging bullet; therefore, the burden of proving
causation as to a particular defendant was not carried by the plaintiff. The
Summers court, unwilling to strain the concert of action theory to cover
that situation, nevertheless held that it would be unfair to prevent the
plaintiff from recovering when it was clear that one or the other of the two
defendants, both of whom were negligent, caused the accident. The court
thus found each defendant liable in the absence of evidence to show that
one of them was not the causative party. 62
A kind of alternative liability occasionally has been applied against two
or more defendants, only one of whom was probably liable for tortious
conduct, under a liberalized version of the res iOsa loquitur doctrine.63 In
58. Id at 359.
59. Id at 373-74. See also Namm v. Charles E. Frosst & Co., 178 N.J. Super. 19, 427
A.2d 1121 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1981). This was a suit against 44 drug manufacturers of
DES. The plaintiff relied on two theories of liability described as "alternative" liability and
"enterprise" liability. The argument was in effect for collective liability based on the fact
that DES was accepted as a safe drug for use in the prevention of miscarriages due to the
cumulative effort of all who entered the market and urged FDA approval for the sale for
such a purpose. 427 A.2d at 1128-29.
60. See notes 12-19 supra and accompanying text.
61. 33 Cal. 2d 80, 199 P.2d 1 (1948). Some courts have tried to rely on the concert of
action theory even when the concert of action was not for an improper purpose. See, e.g.,
Oliver v. Miles, 144 Miss. 852, 110 So. 666 (1926); Benson v. Ross, 143 Mich. 452, 106 N.W.
1120 (1906).
62. 199 P.2d at 5.
63. See, e.g., Beaudoin v. Watertown Memorial Hosp., Inc., 62 Wis. 2d 132, 145
N.W.2d 166 (1966); Homer v. Northern Pac. Bene. Ass'n Hosp., Inc., 62 Wash. 2d 351, 382
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Ybarra v. Spangard, a hospital and several doctors and nurses were per-
missively joined at trial; all were held liable on proof that a patient went
into the hospital for an appendectomy and emerged from the operation
with an injury to his neck and shoulder.64 Much of the court's decision
focused upon the fact that the patient was unconscious during the tortious
act and consequently had no real access to evidence that would establish
the true cause of injury.65
These two California examples were urged upon the California Supreme
Court in Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories,66 one of the many DES cases.
Both Summers and Ybarra, however, are examples of single events in
which the defendants were present at or about the time the injury was
inflicted; moreover, each defendant was in a much better position than the
plaintiff to explain what had occurred. Discovery rules do not alter the
fact that, in the absence of an explanation from a defendant who ought to
know the facts surrounding the accident, it is fair and just to shift the bur-
den of persuasion. Thus, Sindell ruled that although the specific manufac-
turer of DES could not clearly be identified, the plaintiff could still hold all
manufacturers liable upon a showing that each defendant produced a sub-
stantial percentage share of the drug in question.67
In products liability cases, however, courts generally have not aban-
doned the traditional position that in the single damaging event situation,
an essential element of the plaintiff's case is the identification of the spe-
cific defendant as the manufacturer of the alleged defective product.68
Texas cases are in accord.69 The alternative liability theory also has been
applied in products liability cases other than those concerning DES. These
cases usually involve situations where the product causing injury was
clearly manufactured by one defendant, but the defect itself may be attrib-
utable to one of several defendants. Thus, in a Michigan case, a plaintiff
P.2d 518 (1963); Frost v. Des Moines Still College of Osteopathy & Surgery, 248 Iowa 294,
79 N.W.2d 306 (1956); Ybarra v. Spangard, 25 Cal. 2d 486, 154 P.2d 687 (1944). See gener-
ally Thode, The Unconscious Patient: *ho Should Bear the Risk of Unexplained Injuries to a
Healthy Part of His Body?, [1969] UTAH L. REV. 1.
64. Ybarra v. Spangard, 25 Cal. 2d 486, 154 P.2d 687 (1944).
65. Id at 689. The court noted that if the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur was to serve its
true purpose, it must be applicable in situations in which the defendants have full access to
information concerning the cause of the injury, but the plaintiffs through no fault of their
own do not. Id
66. 26 Cal. 3d 588, 607 P.2d 924, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980).
67. 607 P.2d 936-38. This finding was not, however, one of pure enterprise liability in
that the plaintiff was required to prove each defendant produced a substantial amount of the
drug in question. A manufacturer of a very small percentage of market-share proportions
could thus be held not liable. Id at 937. Likewise, pure alternative liability and pure con-
cert of action liability was rejected. Id at 930-35.
68. See Baker v. Coca-Cola Bottling Works, 132 Ind. App. 390, 177 N.E.2d 759 (1961);
Keegan v. Green Giant Co., 150 Me. 283, 110 A.2d 599 (1954). See also Annot., 51
A.L.R.3d 1344 (1973).
69. In Welch v. Coca-Cola Bottlers' Ass'n, 380 S.W.2d 26 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland
1964, no writ), suit was filed as a result of injuries sustained by the plaintiff due to a foreign
substance in a bottle of Coca-Cola. The court held that if recovery is sought from a bottler,
it must be shown that the defendant was the bottler. Id at 30. See Coca-Cola Bottling Co.
v. Fillmore, 453 S.W.2d 239 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1970, no writ).
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recovered damages for personal injuries even though he was unable to
prove whether a defect that caused brake failure of a delivery truck was
caused by the manufacturer or the dealer. 70 Likewise, in the New Jersey
case of Anderson v. Somberg, where the plaintiff suffered injury in the
course of a back operation when a surgical instrument broke off and lodg-
ed in the spine, several defendants were held liable under alternative lia-
bility.7' The court held that a surgeon who used the needle, the hospital
that supplied the needle after several previous uses, and the manufacturer
of the needle could each be held liable for the entire amount of damages in
the absence of exculpatory evidence by a particular defendant.72 Finally,
in at least two states, a rule has been adopted in exploding bottle cases
permitting a plaintiff to join the maker of the bottle, the bottler, and the
retailer, holding each responsible for the entire amount of damages in the
products suits. 73 Thus, the alternative liability theory occassionally has
been utilized in products liability litigation, but only as against those in the
marketing chain as well as users who have had some identification with a
product that was either defective or improperly used at the time of the
specific damaging event.
F Enterprise and Market-Share Liability
Enterprise and market-share liability is not to be confused with concert
of action. The case that has attracted the most attention and which
adopted a similar but slight variation of the alternative liability doctrine is
Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories.74 In this case, the Supreme Court of Cali-
fornia imposed liability on each of the eleven defendant drug manufactur-
ers of DES that were joined in the lawsuit for a proportionate share of a
particular victim's damage for cancer attributable to DES. The require-
ments for market-share liability are: 1) injury or illness occasioned by a
fungible product (identical product) made by all of the defendants joined
in the lawsuit; 2) injury or illness due to a design hazard, with each defend-
ant having been found to have sold the product in a manner that made it
unreasonably dangerous (either a failure to warn by all or an unreasonably
dangerous product design); 3) specific manufacturer of the product or
products that caused the injury or illness cannot be identified by the plain-
tiff, and 4) plaintiff has joined enough of the manufacturers of the fungible
or identical product to represent a substantial share of the market.75
Any defendant can exculpate itself by showing that it could not have
manufactured the product. A proper application of the concert of action
theory would seem to dictate that there would be industry-wide liability
70. Snider v. Bob Thibodeau Ford, Inc., 42 Mich. App. 708, 202 N.W.2d 727 (1972).
71. 67 N.J. 291, 338 A.2d 1 (1973).
72. 338 A.2d at 4.
73. Nichols v. Nold, 174 Kan. 613, 258 P.2d 317 (1953); Lock v. Confair, 372 Pa. 212, 93
A.2d 451 (1953).
74. 26 Cal. 3d 588, 607 P.2d 924, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980).




even when the manufacturer of the DES was identified. Only those de-
fendants who are unable to exculpate themselves will then be liable, and
apparently each defendant will be liable for the proportion of the totality
of the plaintiff's damages represented by its share of the market-perhaps
its share of the market in the state where the DES was purchased by the
user. There is some ambiguity about the Sindell opinion, but it can be
implied that the court did not intend to provide for joint and several
liability.
As indicated by the district court in Hardy v. Johns-Man ville Sales Corp.,
the adoption of this theory in Texas could bring with it a number of
problems.76 Initially, it is said that the application of this principle de-
pends upon the joinder of enough defendants to represent a substantial
share of the market. Apparently, this requirement is imposed to make it
more likely than not that one of the defendants did make the product that
was actually used. This would tend to support the holding that the culpa-
ble source would not escape all responsibility. It is therefore likely that the
claimant must join enough of the manufacturers to represent more than
50% of the market. It is not clear from the Sindell opinion, however,
whether 50% is or should be the appropriate cut-off point for a substantial
share of the market. Perhaps a greater or lesser share should be the
standard.
There are also difficulties in defining the appropriate market as to time,
purpose, and geography. Moreover, there is difficulty with the identical or
fungible product concept. It can be argued that it would not be reasonable
to apply this theory to asbestos products because they are by no means
identical as to the degree of danger due to varying amounts of asbestos in
the products. Such a criticism would not apply, however, to the distribu-
tion of DES. Furthermore, many products come off the assembly line
somewhat flawed, thus affecting the dangerous characteristics of the prod-
uct. It is questionable to impose group responsibility on all manufacturers
of products upon the theory that their respective products are identical
when they often are not. This group responsibility is by no means as effec-
tive a deterrent to the production of defective products as is individual
responsibility. Finally, it is not clear what the result is to be when market
shares cannot be identified with reasonable certainty. Courts have delayed
resolution of this issue, leaving unanswered the critical question of the po-
tential scope of available remedies.
76. 509 F. Supp. 1353 (E.D. Tex. 1981), appealdocketed, No. 81-2204 (5th Cir. May 29,




II. PRODUCTS LIABILITY AFTER DISSOLUTION OF THE CORPORATE
MANUFACTURER OR SALE OF CORPORATE MANUFACTURER'S
ASSETS
A. Claims Against a Dissolved or Selling Manufacturer
A cause of action based on the sale of a defective product may not arise
or be discovered until many years after such sale. Thus, the probability for
recovery greatly decreases because of the likelihood that one or more of
the possible defendants no longer exists and, therefore, is incapable of sat-
isfying a judgment. The Texas Supreme Court addressed one aspect of
this problem in Hunter v. Fort Worth Capital Corp. 77 In this case the
Hunter-Hayes Company installed an elevator in a building under con-
struction in 1960. In 1975 the elevator fell when a valve in the elevator pit
broke, permanently injuring the plaintiff. Shortly after the installation,
however, Hunter-Hayes had transferred its assets to the Dover Corpora-
tion for 25,000 shares of Dover preferred stock. Hunter-Hayes then
changed it name to H.H. Hunter Corporation and distributed the shares of
Dover stock among its shareholders; H.H. Hunter Corporation was issued
a certificate of dissolution on March 11, 1964. The plaintiff sued the for-
mer stockholders of Hunter-Hayes and they defended on the ground that
suit had to be brought within three years of dissolution.7
8
At common law a corporation's capacity to sue or be sued terminated
when the corporation dissolved.79 An equitable doctrine developed, how-
ever, to circumvent the harsh result of this rule. This doctrine deems assets
received by shareholders upon dissolution of a corporation to be a "trust
fund" for the benefit of any unpaid creditors.80 Most of the cases applying
this trust fund doctrine have involved claims that existed prior to dissolu-
tion.81 Also, all states now have statutes that modify the strict common
law rule and allow the corporation to sue and be sued following dissolu-
tion. The statutes vary in at least two respects: 1) the time within which
77. 620 S.W.2d 547 (Tex. 1981).
78. See TEX. Bus. CORP. AcT ANN. art. 7.12 (Vernon 1980).
79. See Nardis Sportswear v. Simmons, 147 Tex. 608, 218 S.W.2d 451, 453 (1949);
Burkburnett Ref. Co. v. Ilseng, 116 Tex. 366, 292 S.W. 179, 181 (1927); Life Ass'n of
America v. Goode, 71 Tex. 90, 8 S.W. 639, 640 (1888).
80. See Norton, Relationship of Shareholders to Corporate Creditors upon Dissolution.-
Nature and Implications of the "Trust Fund" Doctrine of Corporate Assets, 30 Bus. LAW.
1061 (1975).
81. See Wallach, Products Liability: A Remedy in Search of a Defendant-The Effect of
a Sale of Assets and Subsequent Dissolution on Product Dissatis/action Claims, 41 Mo. L.
REv. 321 (1976).
The following cases involve claims which had been asserted before dissolution: Gaskins
v. Bonfels, 79 F.2d 352 (10th Cir. 1935); King v. Coosa Valley Mineral Prods. Co., 215 So.
2d 275 (Ala. 1968); John Julian Const. Co. v. Monarch Builders, Inc., 306 A.2d 29 (Del.
Super. 1973); Collins v. Richland Aviation Serv., Inc., 225 So. 2d 241 (La. App. 1969).
The following cases involve claims which may have existed prior to dissolution, but were
not asserted by the creditor until after dissolution: Hutton v. Commissioner, 59 F.2d 66 (9th
Cir. 1932); Drew v. United States, 367 F.2d 828 (Ct. Cl. 1966); Zinn v. Bright, 87 Cal. Rptr.




the suit must be brought on a claim, and, 2) the applicability of the statute
to post-dissolution claims or causes of action. Approximately half of the
states, including Texas, have statutes resembling section 105 of the Model
Business Corporation Act.82 Article 7.12 of the Texas Business Corpora-
tion Act provided for suits against a dissolved corporation for a period of
three years after dissolution on claims or causes of action arising prior to
dissolution.83
The issue before the Texas Supreme Court in Hunter was whether the
legislature intended this statute to replace the equitable court-made trust
fund theory or to be an additional or alternative remedy available to pre-
dissolution claimants. If the statutory cause of action is the exclusive rem-
edy against the corporation or its former shareholders, then, unless the
successor entity is held responsible, no remedy exists for a person injured
by a corporation's defective product subsequent to the corporation's disso-
lution. Therefore, the question of the liability of the successor entity is
important. There are three possible ways to deal with such losses occur-
ring after dissolution of the selling corporation. The first alternative is to
shift the loss to the dissolved corporation or its shareholders. The second
is to shift the loss to the successor corporation. Thirdly, the courts could
decline to shift the loss and leave the injured party without a remedy.
There are reasonable arguments for the position that more harm than good
results from allowing product liability claims long after the sale of a prod-
uct even in the absence of either a dissolution of the selling corporation or
a sale of the corporate assets related to the production of the kind of prod-
uct involved. Thus, some states have passed statutes of repose that cut off
claims after six or more years following the sale of a product.8 The
82. Citations to the state statutes are collected in the MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT ANN.
§ 105. See also W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS §§ 8127, 8142-43
(1962); Note, Suits By andAgainst Dissolved Corporations, 48 IowA L. REv. 1006, 1009-11
(1963); Wallach, supra note 81, at 329, n.30.
83. Art. 7.12 of the Texas Business Corporation Act reads as follows:
Survival of Remedy After Dissolution
A. The dissolution of a corporation either (1) by the issuance of a certifi-
cate of dissolution by the Secretary of State, or (2) by a decree of court when
the court has not liquidated the assets and business of the corporation as pro-
vided in this Act, or (3) by expiration of its period of duration, shall not take
away or impair any remedy available to or against such corporation, its of-
ficers, directors, or shareholders, for any right or claim existing, or any liability
incurred, prior to such dissolution if action or other proceeding thereon is
commenced within three years after the date of such dissolution. Any such
action or proceeding by or against the corporation may be prosecuted or de-
fended by the corporation in its corporate name. The shareholders, directors,
and officers shall have power to take such corporate or other action as shall be
appropriate to protect such remedy, right, or claim. If such corporation was
dissolved by the expiration of its period of duration, such corporation may
amend its articles of incorporation at any time during such period of three
years so as to extend its period of duration.
TEx. Bus. CoRP. ACT ANN. art. 7.12 (Vernon 1980).
84. The Oregon product liability statute provides that a product liability action shall be
commenced not later than eiht years after the date on which the product was first
purchased for use or consumption. OR. REv. STAT. § 30.905 (1979). Under the Kentucky
product liability statute, it is presumed in all product liability actions, unless rebutted by a
[Vol. 36
1982] TORTS
Hunter court, with two justices dissenting, held that the legislature, by
adopting the statute, intended to preclude recovery under the trust fund
theory.8 5 In all probability, this is what the drafters of the Model Business
Corporation Act intended. 86 Moreover, there is a policy reason for hold-
ing the statute to be the exclusive remedy. This policy is that there should
be some time limit on how long former shareholders of a corporation
should be subject to liability and the possibility of claims against them.
The policy arguments in support of products liability tend more to support
either liability against successor entities or, in the rare case in which suc-
cessor liability would not be reasonable, the abrogation of a remedy.
B Tort Liability of Successor Entities
A purchaser of the assets of a corporation does not, by virtue of the
contract of purchase, become bound to assume any of the liabilities of the
corporate seller.87 If a purchaser pays fair value for the assets, then credi-
tors, obligees, and shareholders are not regarded as having been improp-
erly treated by the transaction. Thus, the general rule is that a purchaser
does not ipsofacto assume any liabilities. For this reason the two justices
dissented in Hunter.88 They argued that the net effect of the majority
holding that the successor entity is not liable would be to leave the victim
of defective products without a remedy in those cases in which the selling
corporation dissolves after a sale of its corporate assets.89 The dissenters
stated that such a rule allows a purchaser to acquire all of the benefits of a
dissolved corporation without the liabilities. At the same time, the dissent-
ers argued, the former shareholders of the dissolved corporation can dis-
preponderance of the evidence, that a product is not defective if injury, death, or property
damage occurred more than eight years after the date of manufacture. Ky. REv. STAT.
§ 411.310 (1980 Supp.). See also discussion in P. KEETON, D. OWEN, & J. MONTGOMERY,
CASES AND MATERIALS ON PRODUCTS LIABILITY AND SAFETY 1009-12 (1980).
85. See notes 77-81 supra and accompanying text.
86. The comment to section 105 of the Model Act seems to suggest that the equitable
action no longer has a purpose to fulfill after the passage of a statute that would allow a
claim against the corporation for a specified time after dissolution. See Miller, The Status of
Choses in Action of Dissolved But Unadministered Corporations After Expiration of the Statu-
tory Periodfor Winding Up, 9 Miss. L.J. 455, 462-64 (1937).
87. Kloberdanz v. Joy Mfg. Co., 288 F. Supp. 817 (D. Colo. 1968); Z. CAVITCH, BUsI-
NESS ORGANIZATIONS §§ 161.01-.02 (1975); Juenger & Schulman, Asset Sales and Products
Liability, 22 WAYNE L. REv. 39, 40 (1975).
88. Hunter v. Fort Worth Capital Corp., 620 S.W.2d 547, 553 (Tex. 1981).
89. The dissent wrote:
As some writers have openly observed, a corporation seeking to acquire an-
other corporation should purchase only its assets in exchange for stock in the
purchasing corporation.
The selling corporation, left with no assets except the stock it received for
sale, distributes that stock to its own shareholders, then dissolves. By this pro-
cedure, the acquiring corporation obtains all of the benefits and assets of the
dissolved corporation but none of its liabilities. The shareholders of the dis-
solved corporation have received value for their stock, yet are shielded from
contributing to the compensation of the victims of the wrongs perpetrated by
the dissolved corporation to the extent of assets received by them upon
dissolution.
Id at 556 (citations omitted).
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pose of their liability merely by selling their stock. Thus, a victim of a
defective product manufactured by a dissolved corporation would have no
recourse. The dissenters, however, pointed out a way to relieve most of the
hardship to victims without burdening former shareholders of a dissolved
corporation. They proposed that the law should transfer liability to the
successor corporation because the successor acquires the "good will" and
the "capacity" to bear the loss of damage caused by the defective products
of the selling corporation. This may be a better solution, particularly in
products liability cases.90
In this regard, there are five common law exceptions to the general rule
that the purchaser of the assets of a corporation does not assume any ex-
isting liabilities of the selling corporation. The first exception arises when
a purchaser expressly or impliedly agrees to assume debts and other legal
obligations of the seller. The litigation on this exception usually turns on
whether there was an implied promise to assume tort obligations for claims
resulting from post-sale accidents.9 1
A second exception to the general rule occurs when a transaction be-
tween the purchasing corporation and the selling corporation amounts to a
consolidation or a merger of the seller and the purchaser. An exchange of
stock of the two corporations for stock of a newly formed corporation tra-
ditionally accompanies a consolidation that is not, in reality, an exception
to the rule but rather a different type of transaction. A third corporation is
formed and the third corporation acquires the assets of the two old corpo-
rations. A merger involves the actual absorption of one corporation into
another with the stockholders of the former becoming stockholders of the
latter.92 The old corporations do not dissolve, they just take on a new
form. Thus, the consolidated or merged corporation has all of the rights
and liabilities of the parent entity or entities.93
A third exception arises when the transaction is consummated in fraud
of creditors and others to whom the seller has obligations. 94 A Louisiana
court, for example, found that the defendants sold a corporation to avoid
liability on possible tort claims. In this case many of the stockholders and
employees of the transferee or purchasing company were the same stock-
holders and employees of the selling company. Several months prior to
the transfer of assets, gas had escaped from the transferor's defective pipe-
line and exploded. The court found that the consideration paid for the
90. See Wallach, supra note 81.
91. Bippus v. Norton Co., 437 F. Supp. 104 (E.D. Pa. 1977); accord Rosales v. Dixie
Mill Supply Co., 376 So. 2d 179 (La. Ct. App. 1979), aff'dper curiam, 381 So. 2d 825 (La.
1980); McKee v. Harris-Seybold Co., 109 N.J. Super. 555, 264 A.2d 98 (Super. Ct. Law Div.
1970).
92. See Leannais v. Cincinnati, Inc., 565 F.2d 437 (7th Cir. 1977).
93. TEx. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 7.12 (Vernon 1980); see Western Resources Life
Ins. Co. v. Gerhardt, 553 S.W.2d 783 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1977, writ refd n.r.e.). The
court stated that "the imposition of liability upon the succeeding corporation is grounded
upon the notice that no corporation should be permitted to commit a tort and avoid liability
through corporate transformations or changes in form only." Id at 786.
94. See id at 786.
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transfer was inadequate and thus concluded that the transfer was not a
good faith sale.95
Recent cases have greatly extended the possibilities of recovering against
a corporation that purchases the assets of another corporation either with
stock or for cash. I will refer to these developments as establishing a
fourth and fifth exception. While the transaction between the corporation
purchasing the assets and the corporation selling the assets may not
amount to either a merger or a consolidation, the purchasing company
may become, in fact, a mere continuation of the seller's enterprise. This is
the fourth exception to the rule. It is often called a defacto merger. A de
facto merger usually occurs when the purchasing company uses shares of
its own stock in the acquisition of the assets of the selling corporation so
that the shareholders of the selling corporation become owners of some
shares in the purchasing corporation. Thus, those who were owners of the
selling corporation became at least partial owners of the purchasing corpo-
ration and have an ownership interest in the purchasing corporation some-
what equivalent in value to that formerly held in the selling corporation. 96
The rationale for imposing liability on corporations formed by a defacto
merger is the same as that for upholding liability in the case of consolida-
tions or mergers. That is, a corporation should not be able to escape liabil-
ity because of a mere formality.97
The fifth exception has been called the "product line" rule. This rule
departs from corporate law and adopts the same principle of enterprise tort
liability commonly employed to protect society from the construction and
sale of unreasonably dangerous products. The rules pertaining to consoli-
dations, mergers, and defacto mergers were developed to protect share-
holders, creditors, and, perhaps, those with certain contractual rights.
These may, however, be inadequate to deal with principles of strict liabil-
95. Wolff v. Shreveport Gas, Elec. Light & Power Co., 138 La. 743, 70 So. 789 (1916).
96. Leannais v. Cincinnati, Inc., 565 F.2d 437 (7th Cir. 1977); Shannon v. Samuel Lang-
ston Co., 379 F. Supp. 797 (W.D. Mich. 1974); Western Resources Life Ins. Co. v. Gerhardt,
553 S.W.2d 783 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1977, writ refd n.r.e.).
97. Some of the recent cases have set forth the requirements of a defacto merger as
follows: (1) there is a continuity of management, personnel, physical location, assets, and
general business operations; (2) there is a continuity of shareholders which results from the
purchasing company using shares of its own stock in the acquisition of the assets of the
selling corporation so that the shareholders of the selling corporation become shareholders
of the purchasing corporation; (3) the selling corporation ceases its ordinary business opera-
tions, liquidates and dissolves as soon as legally and practically possible; (4) the purchasing
corporation assumes those obliations, such as contractual obligations, ordinarily necessary
for the uninterrupted continuation of normal business. See cases cited in note 96 supra. A
few courts have attempted to liberalize the standards for determining a "continuation of the
enterprise" of the selling corporation. This has been by way of eliminating the second re-
quirement of a continuity of shareholders. Thus, a few courts have recognized that even
though the assets of the selling corporation are acquired with cash, there can be a continua-
tion of the selling enterprise by satisfaction of the other three requirements. Community of
ownership in the purchasing and selling corporations is unnecessary if there is community of
management, location, personnel, and product line and the selling corporation ceases its
,ordinary business operations. See Cyr v. B. Offen & Co., 501 F.2d 1145 (1st Cir. 1974);
Bonee v. L & M Constr. Chem., 518 F. Supp. 375 (M.D. Tenn. 1981); Turner v. Bituminous
Casualty Co., 397 Mich. 406, 244 N.W.2d 873 (1976).
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ity related to defective products. Under the product line theory, claimants
may recover for accidents that occur long after a defective product has
been sold and after there has been a transfer of the good will and the right
to produce and sell that kind of product to another. Courts in at least two
states, California and New Jersey, have found it to be in the public interest
to expand orthodox notions of successor liability to deal particularly with
products liability claims.98 The basis of this approach is the notion of con-
tinuation of the product line rather than a continuation of the enterprise. 99
The principal and perhaps only requirements seem to be that the purchas-
ing corporation acquire substantially all the assets of the selling corpora-
tion and that the purchasing corporation continue to produce essentially
the same product. Whether utilization of the same trade name is necessary
is not settled. The rationale for adopting the product-line rule is threefold.
First, transfer of assets can virtually destroy any action against the original
manufacturer. Second, the purchasing corporation acquires the capacity
of the original manufacturer to bear the costs of accidents. Third, it is fair
and equitable that the burden attached to the original manufacturer's good
will, which is now enjoyed by the successor, should be transferred to the
successor. 1oo
98. Ray v. /ad Corp., 19 Cal. 3d 22, 560 P.2d 3, 136 Cal. Rptr. 574 (1977); Nieves v.
Bruno Sherman Corp., 86 N.J. 361, 431 A.2d 826 (1981); Ramirez v. Amsted Indus., Inc., 86
N.J. 332, 431 A.2d 811 (1981).
99. See cases collected in note 98 supra.
100. Id
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